Cost-saving or Cost-enhancing Mergers: the Impact of the Distribution of Roles in Oligopoly by Nicolas Le Pape & Kai Zhao
 
 
              WORKING PAPER 
 

















Cost-saving or Cost-enhancing Mergers: the Impact 


























TEPP - Institute for Labor Studies and Public Policies 



















































 Cost-saving or Cost-enhancing Mergers: the
Impact of the Distribution of Roles in Oligopoly
Preliminary version
Nicolas LE PAPE∗ Kai ZHAO†
July 13, 2010
Abstract
We consider ﬁrms perfectly symmetrical on production costs in the
pre-merger game but the cost of the merged entity may be amended due
to the anti-competitive eﬀects of the merger. The lack of empirical pre-
cision concerning the eﬀect of the merger on production costs (Scherer,
1980 or Tichy, 2002) justiﬁes our theoretical model in which we do not
specify a priori the exact production cost in the post merger game. Two
ﬁrms in Stackelberg oligopoly game take part in the merger. The aim of
this paper is to identify under which conditions on the cost the merger is
privately proﬁtable and socially desirable when ﬁrms in the coalition are
either leaders or followers. We show that a merger could remain proﬁtable
even if the merged entity suﬀers from eﬃciency losses and we identify the
condition on eﬃciency gains below which the merger takes place with
the exclusion of all rivals. Among all possible cases, a proﬁtable merger
between two ﬁrms of diﬀerent roles (leader & follower) could potentially
give rise to more eﬃciency losses than the one encompassing ﬁrms of the
same role. Moreover, proﬁtable mergers can induce either an increase or
a decrease in social welfare except for the case where two leaders decide
to merge. Consequently this paper argues that Competition Authorities
must supervise more closely two-ﬁrm mergers including either one or two
followers.
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11 Introduction
When horizontal mergers are motivated by the achievement of eﬃciency gains
it is natural to assume that the production cost after the merger decreases.
Cost-savings caused by the merger may arise from the combination of multiple
factors: rationalization of production, economies of scale, economies of scope,
purchasing economies and so on. One can also imagine that the merger give rise
to eﬃciency gains by increasing the incentives of the merging parties to invest
in cost-reducing R&D.
Nevertheless, the positive impact of horizontal mergers on eﬃciency is weak-
ened by the increase in the monopoly power. When competition becomes softer,
the incentives of companies to engage in cost reduction activities may be reduced
(approach advocated by the proponents of the productive eﬃciency) and a hor-
izontal merger with anti-competitive eﬀects decreases the pressure to realize ef-
ﬁciency gains. In the case where the market price following a merger increases,
the production cost of the merging entity may increase while keeping the market
power unaltered. This impact of a merger on price is obtained when we assume
that ﬁrms are engaged in quantities competition with homogenous products and
when costs are symmetric and linear. In this contest, horizontal mergers imply a
reduction in the number of competitors. As a result, the market price increases
as well as the concentration degree1 and the ﬁrm’s market power. Nevertheless,
changes in product market competition are likely to adversely aﬀect manage-
rial incentives (Brander and Spencer, 1983). Horizontal mergers may reduce
the incentives of managers and workers to exert eﬀort. If we suppose that the
production cost of a ﬁrm reﬂects partially the eﬀort deployed by a manager, the
managerial contract which induces the manager to carry on the optimal level
of eﬀort is aﬀected by the pressure of the product market competition (Hart,
1983). When the competition is softer, both the risk of bankruptcy and the
layoﬀ risk decrease, so it could imply indirectly a reduction in the managerial
eﬀort2 and in the eﬃciency of the ﬁrm3. Furthermore, production ineﬃciency
could stem from a conﬂict between corporate cultures, it could also arise from
some diﬃculties in motivating workers in the newly merged entity. Mergers may
also limit the ability of shareholders to provide the right incentives to managers
by making it harder to engage in yardstick competition. Finally, horizontal
mergers through their impact on the rivalry may weaken contractual relations
within the merged company and indirectly damage their eﬃciency.
The question of eﬃciency gains related to horizontal mergers is widely dis-
cussed4 whereas there is a consensus concerning their eﬀects on the market
1From an empirical viewpoint, Schmalensee (1989) notes that the increase in markets
concentration in many countries stems from mergers.
2this argument may be reversed if it is argued that the marginal returns of the en-
trepreneurial eﬀort increases when the intensity of competition decreases (Schmidt, 1997)
3This type of argument can also be put forward in the case of a cartelization of the market.
4In empirical studies, it is suspected the achievement of eﬃciency gains in the event of
horizontal merger when proﬁts and sales increase (since the data on the costs are not directly
2price. According to Scherer :”an impressive accumulation of evidence points
to the conclusion that mergers seldom yield substantial cost savings, real or pe-
cuniary” (Scherer, 1980, p.546 quoted by Levin, 1990, p.1238). Tichy (2002)
observes that only 25% of mergers generate eﬃciency gains. In some studies, it
has been also identiﬁed that ﬁrms involved in merger operations may register a
decline in their market share (Mueller, 1985). This lack of empirical precision
concerning the eﬀect of the merger on production costs justiﬁes our theoretical
model in which the production cost of the merged entity is amended due to the
merger. The exogenous uncertainty relating to the magnitude of cost variation
in relationship with the merger interacts with both the private proﬁtability and
the social desirability of anticompetitive horizontal mergers. From the theo-
retical viewpoint, in a Cournot oligopoly game with incomplete information in
eﬃciency gains, Amir et al,.(2009) consider that outsiders are uncertain about
the merged entity’s cost. They ﬁnd that if the non-merged ﬁrms suﬃciently be-
lieve that the merger will generate large enough eﬃciency gains, the two-ﬁrms
merger will be proﬁtable.
In our model, there are both leaders and followers within the industry. All
ﬁrms bear the same marginal cost of production before the decision to merge.
Considering that the merger can give rise to either eﬃciency gains or eﬃciency
losses, there is uncertainty on what will be the production cost of the merged
entity. We focus on all possible two-ﬁrm mergers and their eﬀects on the prof-
itability of the merging ﬁrms when the marginal cost incurred by the merging
ﬁrms may vary after the decision to merge. We evaluate the magnitude on cost
reduction/increase of a proﬁtable merger according to the role of ﬁrms (followers
and/or leaders) engaged in the coalition. We study also the impact of horizontal
mergers on welfare.
A common feature of theoretical models on horizontal merger in Stackelberg
games is that the proﬁtability of mergers is examined in a context where there is
no change in the marginal production cost. Under this assumption, several au-
thors have shown that the private incentive to merge is clearly reinforced by the
coexistence of leaders and followers in the industry even in the presence of lin-
ear cost. When a merged ﬁrm changes its behavior from a Cournot-Nash player
to a Stackelberg leader player (Levin, 1990), the private incentive to merge is
higher and antagonism between the private and the collective advantage of the
merger disappears 5. In a game where asymmetric roles among the ﬁrms in the
pre-merger situation (Stackelberg leader and Stackelberg follower compete in
homogeneous good market) are introduced6, mergers can also improve welfare
available). One of the diﬃculties of this methodology is that it does not allow to distinguish
between the eﬀect of cost lowering and the eﬀect of the increase in the market power.
5Proﬁtable mergers can also generate a rise in social welfare
6The possibility of a merger in a generalized hierarchical Stackelberg model are examined
by Hamada and Takarada (2007). They show that the incentive to merge is strengthened
when the merger encompasses ﬁrms that are at diﬀerent stages and make production decisions
sequentially in the pre-merger situation.
3and proﬁts. For instance, when two followers decide to merge and when the
newly merged entity behaves as a leader on the product market, the social wel-
fare and merging ﬁrms’ proﬁts increase even without cost savings following the
merger (Daughety, 1990). In Stackelberg markets with n rival ﬁrms and linear
costs, two leaders rarely have an incentive to merge, nor do two followers when
the new entity stays in the same category (Huck, Konrad and Mueller, 2001).
The private incentive to merge is strongly enhanced when the coalition con-
cerns a leader and a follower but such mergers lead to a decline of social welfare
(Feltovich, 2001). When all ﬁrms in a Stackelberg game share the same convex
cost, a two-ﬁrm merger between either two leaders or two followers7 become
proﬁtable if a suﬃcient cost convexity is introduced (Heywood and McGinty,
2007). Escrihuela-Villar and Fauli-Oller (2008) assume that prior to the merger
the leaders are more eﬃcient than followers. They show that when the followers
are ineﬃcient enough, mergers among followers become proﬁtable.
In this paper, we extend the theoretical literature dealing with the eﬀects
of horizontal mergers in Stackelberg games in two main directions. In the one
hand, by considering that the merger introduces some uncertainty on what will
be the cost of the newly merged entity. A merger brings on eﬃciency gains
when the merged ﬁrm has a lower marginal production cost. Conversely, eﬃ-
ciency losses appears when a merged ﬁrm produces at a higher marginal cost
than would separate entities do. In the other hand, by taking all possible two-
ﬁrm mergers into account we compare the extent of eﬃciency losses related to
beneﬁcial mergers and to identify the necessary production eﬃciency leading to
the market monopolization.
We show that some mergers could remain proﬁtable even if the merger gener-
ates eﬃciency losses. The threshold value in eﬃciency losses which depart prof-
itable mergers from unproﬁtable ones is the highest when the coalition gathers a
leader and a follower and the merged entity behaves as a leader. Consequently, a
proﬁtable merger between two ﬁrms of diﬀerent roles (leader & follower) could
give rise to more potential eﬃciency losses than the one encompassing ﬁrms
of the same role. On the opposite side, the threshold value in eﬃciency gains
below which a merger implies the monopolization of the market (the exclusion
of outsiders) is the highest when two leaders decide to merge. If we infer the
easiness to merge from the magnitude in the cost variation allowing for prof-
itable merger, then ﬁrms belonging to diﬀerent types (leader & follower) are
more prone to merge. When the merger gathers two ﬁrms sharing the same role
in the oligopoly and in the absence of redistribution of roles, the welfare-raising
mergers are not always the proﬁtable mergers. Nevertheless when the merger
stems from ﬁrms of diﬀerent roles or contains two ﬁrms followers resulting in a
newly merged leader (redistribution of roles), all the welfare-raising mergers are
proﬁtable but some proﬁtable mergers can induce a decrease in welfare. Con-
7Perry and Porter(1985) have demonstrated that when ﬁrms are engaged in a Cournot
game of the convexity of the function of cost reinforces the incentive to merge.
4sequently, this paper argues that Competition Authorities must supervise more
closely bilateral mergers which consist of either one or two followers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and spec-
iﬁes the subgame perfect equilibria for diﬀerent types of mergers. Section 3
is devoted to a discussion on the private incentive to merge according to the
parameter representative to magnitude in cost variation for the merged entity.
An analysis in terms of welfare is carried out in section 4.
2 The Model
2.1 The pre-merger situation
We consider an industry composed of n initially active ﬁrms producing homoge-
nous products who compete by setting quantity schedules. In a ﬁrst stage,
m < n ﬁrms act as Stackelberg leaders and independently decide on their in-
dividual supply. In a second stage, n − m Stackelberg followers decide upon
their quantity after learning about the total quantity supplied by the leaders.
Initially we assume m ≥ 2 and n ≥ m + 2, the strict inequalities ensure that in
every cases the outsiders gather either leaders or followers in the post merger
situation.8. All ﬁrms face the same constant average cost normalized to 1. The
market price is determined by the linear inverse demand curve P = a−Q where
a > 1. The aggregate industry output is given by Q =
Pn
i=1 qi and qi stands








i . The superscript ’l’ stands for a leader and ’f’ represents
a follower.
The equilibrium is obtained by backward induction. At the second stage,
each follower maximizes its proﬁt (π
f
i ) considering as given the production level
of leader (Ql), to ﬁnd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for followers, we











i = (a − Ql − Qf − 1)q
f
i
Then the best-response function for a follower ﬁrm is shown by q
f
i = a−1−
Qf − Ql. The aggregate output of all followers as a function of the output of
leaders is then Qf = n−m
n−m+1(a − 1 − Ql)
At the ﬁrst stage, a leader selects its proﬁt-maximizing output (ql
i) antici-
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8The particular cases: both m = 0 and m = n correspond to a Cournot industry, the ﬁrms
are in the simultaneous game.
5where Ql
−i = Ql − ql
i







(m + 1)(n − m + 1)
P =
a + m(n − m) + n
(m + 1)(n − m + 1)
The corresponding individual proﬁts are:
πl(n,m) =
(a − 1)2




(m + 1)2(n − m + 1)2
Obviously, the distribution of roles among ﬁrms exhibits the ﬁrst mover ad-
vantage: each leader beneﬁts from higher market share and higher proﬁt in the
pre-merger game.
2.2 The post merger situation
Since we consider a quantity competition with homogenous product and linear
costs, the bilateral merger means that one ﬁrm disappears from the market.
Ceteris paribus, the market power increases in the post merger game. We want
to capture the range of cost variation for merged ﬁrms allowing a proﬁtable
merger. Consequently, we assume that the production cost for ﬁrms engaged in
the coalition varies in the amount △c. The marginal cost of the newly merged
entity becomes 1 + △c while the non-merged ﬁrms’ cost remains constant and
equals to 1. When △c < 0, the bilateral merger generates eﬃciency gains.
This case corresponds to the usual argument which put forward the increase in
productive eﬃciency generated by the merger itself. On the opposite side, if
△c > 0 the merger causes eﬃciency losses. We assume also the condition on
the parameter a : a > max{1,1 + △c}.
In order to capture the impact of the roles’ distribution of merging ﬁrms
on the incentive to merge, we examine four scenarios : a merger between two
leaders (case A), a merger between two followers (case B), a merger between
two followers resulting in a newly merged leader (case C) and a merger between
one leader and one follower resulting in a newly merged leader (case D).
6Case A: a merger between two leaders
In the post merger situation, the industry is composed of m−1 leaders but still
n − m followers since the newly merged entity behave as a leader.
Given the best response function of followers, both the output (ˆ q
l,A
I ) that
maximize the merged ﬁrm’s proﬁt (ˆ π
l,A
I ) and the output (ˆ q
l,A
O ) that maximize
the leader outsiders’ proﬁts (ˆ π
l,A




O = (a − ˆ Q





I = (a − ˆ QA − 1 − △c)ˆ q
l,A
I
where ˆ QA = (m − 1)ˆ q
l,A
O + ˆ q
l,A
I + (n − m − 1)ˆ q
f,A
O
We then obtain the following expressions for the equilibrium production of
the leader insider (ˆ q
l,A
I ), of one leader outsider (ˆ q
l,A







(a − 1) −
￿












(a − 1) + (n − m + 1)△c
m(n − m + 1)
When the merger generates eﬃciency gains, both leaders and followers out-
siders restrict the production at equilibrium. The contraction of production is
the highest for ﬁrms belonging to the category of leaders outsiders.
The price is:
ˆ P A =
a − 1 + (n − m + 1)(△c + m)
m(n − m + 1)





(a − 1) −
￿




m2(n − m + 1)
Case B: a merger between two followers
We consider that two followers take part in the merger. The distribution of roles
in the industry is assumed not to be altered by the merger decision in the way
merged entity behaves as a follower. The industry contains n − 1 ﬁrms with m
7leaders.






a − 1 + △c
(n − m)(m + 1)
− △c
the equilibrium quantities of each category of outsider (ˆ q
l,B
O for one leader
and ˆ q
f,B









a − 1 + △c
(m + 1)(n − m)
The market price is:
ˆ P B =
a − 1 + (n − m)(m + 1) + △c
(n − m)(m + 1)





a − 1 − ((n − m)(m + 1) − 1)△c
￿2
(n − m)2(m + 1)2
Case C: a merger between two followers then the merged entity be-
haves as a leader
Here, we consider a special type of merger wherein two followers merge and the
result is a ﬁrm that behaviorally is a leader. As a result, there are m + 1 ﬁrms
that behave as leaders and in contrast n−m−2 followers. This case was exam-
ined by Daughety (1990) who found that a horizontal merger was potentially
proﬁtable for the merged ﬁrm in the absence of eﬃciency gains 9. Here, we ex-
tend the analysis by considering a possible change on cost caused by the merger.
Let ˆ q
l,C
I and ˆ q
l,C
O be the leader’s quantity conditional on being inside and




(a − 1) −
￿




9He also demonstrates that this type of merger might be advantageous from the point of




a − 1 + (n − m − 1)△c
m + 2




a − 1 + (n − m − 1)△c
(m + 2)(n − m − 1)
The equilibrium price:
ˆ P C =
a − 3 + n(m + 2) − m(m + 3) + △c(n − m − 1)
(m + 2)(n − m − 1)





(a − 1) −
￿




(m + 2)2(n − m − 1)
Case D: a merger between one leader and one follower then the
merged entity behaves as a leader
The number of leaders is the same as that in the case B, but the number of
leaders outside the merger equals to m − 1. The quantity produced by the






a − 1 − m△c
m + 1
The quantities of one leader outsider(ˆ q
l,D












a − 1 + △c




a − 1 + (n − m)(m + 1) + △c
(n − m)(m + 1)







a − 1 − m△c
￿￿
(a − 1) − ((n − m)(m + 1) − 1)△c
￿
(n − m)(m + 1)2
3 Private incentive to merge and market monopolization
The results from the previous section enable us to deal with conditions under
which merger increases the proﬁts of the merging parties. The incentive to
merge is given by the comparison of the sum of proﬁts earned by merging ﬁrms
in pre-merger situation and the proﬁt earned by the newly merged entity.
3.1 Case A






I = ˆ π
l,A
I (△c) − 2π
l(n,m)
The extend of the cost variation for merged ﬁrms interact with the private
incentive to merge. We deﬁne △cA
sup the threshold value of △c which sepa-
rates proﬁtable from unproﬁtable mergers. When △cA < △cA
sup (respectively
△cA > △cA
sup) we have ∆Π
l,A
I > 0 (respectively ∆Π
l,A
I < 0). We also deﬁne
△cA
inf as the value of △cA below which outsiders are ruled out of the market.
It is given by the conditions : ˆ q
l,A
O = 0 and ˆ q
f,A
O = 0. Note that when we
have △cA
inf < △cA < △cA
sup, the merger is proﬁtable and the two categories of
outsiders remain on the market.





n − m + 1
△cA
sup = ηA + ωA − 1
with
ηA =
(a − 2) +
￿
(m − 1)n − (m − 2)m
￿





(m2 − 1)(n − m + 1)
10A risk of exclusion of all outsiders (leaders and followers) exists if the eﬃciency
gains arising from the merger are suﬃciently high and if the market demand is
suﬃciently low. At the opposite, for a > 2−m+n, the conditions ˆ q
l,A
O > 0 and
ˆ q
f,A
O > 0 are veriﬁed regardless of merged ﬁrm’s marginal cost. In such a case,
the merger cannot lead to the exclusion of outsiders.
When m > 2, we have ηA +ωA < 1 implying that △cA
sup is strictly less than
0. This ceiling on △cA means that without eﬃciency gains none of two-ﬁrms
merger is proﬁtable. When no leader belongs to category of outsiders (m=2),
△cA
sup > 0 thus the bilateral merger between two leaders is always proﬁtable
when △c = 0 (in line with the result of Huck et al., 2001).
Result 1: If two leaders are engaged in bilateral mergers:
(i) proﬁtable mergers could lead to market monopolization when the demand size
is not too large (a < n − m + 2),
(i.i) mergers with eﬃciency losses remain proﬁtable when no leader belongs to
outsiders.
Figure 1: Cost-saving and cost-enhancing mergers in case A
The existence of leaders outside of merger ensures that mergers don’t give
rise to the eﬃciency losses.
113.2 Case B
The incentive to merge is described by
∆Π
f,B




The conditions related to a proﬁtable merger (△cB
sup) and to the monopo-
lization of the market (△cB
inf) are given by:
△cB
inf = 1 − a
△cB
sup = ηB + ωB − 1
with
ηB =
a − 2 + (n − m)(m + 1)
(n − m)(m + 1) − 1
ωB = −
√
2(n − m)(a − 1)
m3 − m2n + mn(n − 1) + n2 − 1
Result 2: If two followers are engaged in bilateral mergers:
(i) proﬁtable mergers could lead to market monopolization when the demand size
is not too large (a < 2)
(i.i) merger with eﬃciency losses remain proﬁtable when no follower belongs to
outsiders.
As we have already noticed, proﬁtable mergers between two leaders (case
A) always generate eﬃciency gains when outsiders gather both leaders and fol-
lowers (m > 2). In case of mergers between two followers, eﬃciency losses may
appear when outsiders gather both leaders and followers (m < n − 2).
12Figure 2: Cost-saving and cost-enhancing mergers in case B
3.3 Case C
The incentive to merge is given by the comparison of the sum of proﬁts earned




I = ˆ π
l,C
I (△c) − 2πf(n,m)
Then we obtain boundaries of △c insuring a proﬁtable merger (△cC
sup) and




n − m − a
n − m − 1
− 1
△cC
sup = ηC + ωC − 1
with
ηC =
a − 2 +
￿
m(n − m) + (n − 2m)
￿
(n − m − 1)(m + 1)
ωC = −
(a − 1)(m + 2)
(m + 1)2(n − m + 1)
1
√
n − m − 1
13We can notice that if we suppose △c = 0 (△cC
sup > 0), a merger between
two followers resulting in a new leader is always proﬁtable. The outcome of
Daughety (1990) is veriﬁed.
The merger in case B generates a ﬁrm of the same category and the value of
△c should be less than 0. By contrast, the merger in case C yields a new leader
and △cC
sup is greater than 0. The merged ﬁrm counteracts the ineﬃciency on
the cost by the ﬁrst mover advantage.
Figure 3: Cost-saving and cost-enhancing mergers in case C
In case of low demand (a < 2 < n − m), there is a risk of market monopo-
lization in the post merger situation when the merged entity behaves as a leader
(case C) but when the two merged followers continue to behave as a follower,
the merger never excludes outsiders of the market even if eﬃciency gains are
high. The reverse is true when demand is high (a > n − m).
143.4 Case D
Huck, Konrad and Muller (2001) observe that a merger between one leader and
one follower leading to a leader increases the joint proﬁts of ﬁrms independently
of the number of competitors. If we suppose △c = 0, we obtain the same result.
The private incentive to merge (∆Π
l,D




I = ˆ π
l,D
I (△c) − πl(n,m) − πf(n,m)






inf = 1 − a
△c
D
sup = ηD + ωD − 1
with
ηD =
2m3 + m2(1 − 2n) − m(n − 2) + n + a(1 + m2 − n − mn) − 1




m6 − 2m5(2n + 1) + m4(6n2 + 4n + 3) − 4m3(n3 + n) + m2(n4 − 4n3 + 7) + 2m(n4 − 2n + 1) + (n2 − 1)2
2m
￿
m3 − 2m2n + mn(n − 1) + n2 − 1
￿
The outcome of case D is similar to the result in case C: the merger could
leave out all of the outsiders when the demand is suﬃciently small; it is also
possible that a proﬁtable merger with eﬃciency losses occurs. This contrast
with the case A and the case B where the maximum boundary is always less
than 1 (except n − m = 2 in case B).
Result 3: If two followers or one ﬁrm of each category are engaged in bi-
lateral mergers, mergers with eﬃciency losses remain proﬁtable independently
of the size of demand when the merged entity behaves as a leader.
In the following section, we rank the parameters △cinf and △csup in diﬀer-
ent scenarios.
15Figure 4: Cost-saving and cost-enhancing mergers in case D
4 Efficiency gain and efficiency loss levels
4.1 Ranking
We classify △cinf and △csup in four diﬀerent cases. △cinf represents the thresh-
old on the post merger marginal cost below which the merger leads to the mo-
nopolization. The larger the value of △cinf is, the higher the risk of the merger
with monopolization. We exclude m = 2 and n−m = 2 in order to ensure that





n − m + 1
△cB
inf = △cD




n − m − 1





A merger between two leaders to form a new leader comes about the most
probably compared to the three other cases. Note that whether the merger with
monopolization or not depends also upon the parameter ’a’.
16Figure 5: Possible market monopolization
We now turn to the analysis on △csup. Taking the initial conditions (a >
max{1,c}, m > 2 and n > m + 2) into account, we compare all the △csup in 4
diﬀerent scenarios. We have
Result 5:
• for all n ≥ 5, △cD
sup > △cC
sup > 0 and △cA
sup,△cB
sup < 0
• the ranking between △cA
sup and △cB
sup depends upon n and m:
z when n = {5,6,7,8} : △cA
sup < △cB
sup < 0
z when n ≥ 9:






























Since the value of upper bound of △c in cases C & case D is greater than 0,
a merger with anticompetitive eﬀects could lead to eﬃciency losses.
17If the number of competitors is suﬃciently low (n < 9) or if the number of
leaders is large enough (for n ≥ 9, m > F(n) ), we have : △cB
sup > △cA
sup. This
inequality means that a proﬁtable merger between two leaders requires more
cost reduction in comparison with a proﬁtable merger between two followers. In
other words, the conditions on eﬃciency gains under which the merger is prof-
itable in the case where the coalition gathers two followers are less restrictive.
The higher △csup is, the greater the potential eﬃciency losses due to the
merger is. Thus, mergers between one leader and one follower resulting in a
new leader (case D) generate potential eﬃciency losses higher than the similar
mergers consisted of two followers to form a leader (case C).
The ceiling of △c depends upon the redistribution of roles between the pre-
merger and the post merger situations. If we compare proﬁtable mergers in case
B to ones in case C, it is when two followers can form a leader that eﬃciency
losses exist while similar mergers between two followers without redistribution
of roles always generate eﬃciency gains.
4.2 Market power analysis
The market power is usually deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the price charged
by a ﬁrm and its marginal production cost. When we impose the condition:
PAM = PBM +△c, the merger does not change the market power of the merged
ﬁrm10. This condition implicitly deﬁnes the variation in the production cost
△˜ ci for which the market power of the merged ﬁrm remains constant.
Result 6: If we compare △˜ ci with △ci
sup (for i ∈ {A,B,C,D}), we have:
• △˜ ci < △ci
sup < 0 for i ∈ {A,B}
• △ci
sup > △˜ ci > 0 for i ∈ {C,D}
The inequalities obtained in cases C and D mean that a merger could remain
proﬁtable even if it induces both eﬃciency losses and a decrease in the market
power. Conversely, since △˜ ci < △ci
sup < 0 for i ∈ {A,B}, a proﬁtable merger
always induces eﬃciency gains but can generate a decrease in the market power
when △c ∈ [△˜ ci,△ci
sup].
5 Welfare Analysis
If the merger alters the behavior of the merging ﬁrms, notwithstanding eﬃciency
gains (the production cost is assumed to remain constant), the welfare can be
raised (Daughety 1990). In particular, a merger between two followers resulting
10The subscript ’AM’ denotes the situation ’after the merger’ and the subscript ’BM’ denotes
the case ’before the merger’
18in a new leader does not introduce a discrepancy between private incentive and
social desirability since when the merger is proﬁtable it is also welfare-raising.
We ﬁrst analyze the welfare variations due to diﬀerent types of mergers in
the case where △c = 0. We identify for each scenario, the merger is welfare-
enhancing or welfare-losing. Then, in order to take into account a possibility
of variation in the marginal cost with the decision to merge, simulations give
results on the impact of mergers on proﬁts and welfare.
5.1 No impact of merger on efficiency : the case where △c = 0
In this case, our model corresponds to the analysis proposed by Daughety (1990)
and HKM (2001). We obtain that both a merger between two leaders resulting
in a new leader (case A) and a merger between two followers resulting in a new
follower (case B) lead to an increase in the total proﬁt of the merged entity but
a decrease in the consumer surplus and in the total welfare. Similar results are
obtained in the case of a merger between one leader and one follower resulting
in a new leader (case D). In the three above cases, the eﬀect of the merger on
the industry structure is simply a decrease in the number of one type of ﬁrm
with no change in the number of the other type.
The case of two followers’ forming a leader (case C) is quite diﬀerent because
the number of leaders increases while the number of followers decreases, then the
impact of the merger on the welfare is altered. On the one hand, the decrease
in the number of ﬁrms tends to reduce welfare. On the other hand, since lead-
ers produce a higher output level than followers, the increase in the number of
leaders introduces a countervailing tendency toward higher quantity and higher
welfare. We ﬁnd the same result as Daughety (1990): this type of merger is
welfare raising if the industry is initially made up predominantly of followers11.
The intuition of this result is the following one. An industry with too many
followers results in a poorer market performance in terms of welfare. Hence,
a merger creating a new leader may have a positive eﬀect, which is inversely
proportionate to the number of leaders. As the number of leaders increases,
this eﬀect becomes slight and could be more than outweighed by the negative
aspect of the merger (via the reduction in the number of competitors).
5.2 Mergers with cost variation (c  = 1) : Simulations (n = 12, 3 ≤
m ≤ 9, a = 100)
In the previous subsection where it is assumed that the merger does not impact
the cost, all possible mergers have no ability to enhance the social welfare except
for the case C (merger between two followers resulting in a leader). We extend
the analysis and we study afresh now the welfare with taking into account a
11If m < n
3 − 1, industry output and welfare are increased by the merger (Daughety, 1990)
19possible change in cost due to the merger.
We impose the conditions n = 12 and 3 ≤ m ≤ 9 implying that, in the post
merger situation, the category of outsiders gathers either followers and leaders
ﬁrms. As we have studied in the previous section, when a > n−m+2, mergers
with monopolization never take place. We choose a = 100 in order to avoid
mergers with monopolization. We exclude this case since mergers with monop-
olization, which lessen the competition to a maximum extent, unambiguously
decrease the social welfare.
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Figure 6: Zones for case A
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Figure 7: Zones for case B
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Figure 8: Zones for case C
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Figure 9: Zones for case D
Concerning the private incentive to merge, some interesting results come
from the comparison of the merger’s types. The threshold value of △c below
which the merger is proﬁtable decreases when the number of leaders increases
in case A, contrary to the case B. Nevertheless the ceiling of cost for proﬁtable
merger increases due to the augmentation of the number of leaders when the
coalition concerns the ﬁrms of diﬀerent categories. Under the inﬂuence of redis-
20tribution of roles, the relation between the ceiling cost and the number of leaders
becomes complicated. △csup faces up to the trend of a change downward, if the
industry is initially made up predominantly of followers, contrariwise when the
leaders are dominant in terms of the proportion.
In case of the merger consisted of two ﬁrms deriving from the same clan in
the absence of redistribution of roles, the welfare-raising merger is not always
the proﬁtable merger. Nevertheless when the merger stems from ﬁrms of diﬀer-
ent types or contains two ﬁrms followers resulting in a newly merged leader, all
the welfare-raising mergers are proﬁtable.
For case A, all proﬁtable mergers constitute the welfare-enhancing merger.
However, in other cases the proﬁtable merger could negatively inﬂuence on so-
cial welfare.
6 Conclusion
This paper extends the strand of literature on horizontal mergers in an homo-
geneous oligopoly where some ﬁrms are market leaders. Our main objective
in this paper is to point out that the behavior of ﬁrms (leaders or followers)
engaged in the merging decision interacts with the issue of whether mergers will
generate eﬃciency gains or losses. We ﬁnd that the existence of at least one
leader in the category of outsiders prevent from mergers with eﬃciency losses
when the merger gather two leaders. If two followers merge, eﬃciency gains are
necessarily obtained when at least one follower belongs to outsiders. When one
leader and one follower decide to merge or when the merger between two follow-
ers give rise to a new leader, the distribution of roles among outsiders does not
interact with the extent of cost variation in the post merger situation and some
mergers can introduce some eﬃciency losses. It is when the merger concerns
one leader and one follower that the exposure to eﬃciency losses is the highest.
Concerning the impact of mergers on social welfare, when we impose restrictions
on parameters in order to exclude the market monopolization, our model shows
that proﬁtable mergers are welfare enhancing when two leaders decide to merge.
In the three other cases, the proﬁtable merger can induce either an increase or
a decrease in social welfare. Consequently this paper argues that Competition
Authorities must supervise more closely bilateral mergers which are consisted
of either one or two followers.
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